Position Three: Compatibilism (Both Determinism and Free-Will)

Most of the psychologists whom we have already dealt with were not primarily concerned with the problem of determinism or free-will, but found that they had to make certain assumptions about freedom and determinism in order to proceed in their work or found that, upon introspection, their interests were based upon attempts to at least indirectly justify their position on this issue, or found that their professional experiences lead them to accept one or the other position. Within this third category we find psychologists who were more directly concerned with the issue of determinism and free-will and sought to reconcile the two extreme positions in some way, demonstrating the necessity for both viewpoints.

Developmental perspective

A developmental approach has been taken in dealing with the issue. Andras Angyal (1941, pp.365-73) postulated the “gestalt” nature of the life course. As life proceeds it becomes progressively more deterministic. At the early stages the infant is a rather diffuse whole with many vague possibilities {the Lockean tabula rosa). With increased maturation the individual becomes increasingly crystallized and the ran0e of possibilities decreases. This process might be compared to the gestalt phenomenon of “closure” — the individual’s life becomes increasingly “filled in”.

Constructive perspective

Other theorists have stressed the freeing potential of personality and intellectual development. Adkins (1959, pp. 40=42) speaks of the creative “I” factor which develops with age, while George Kelly (1955, pp. 19-22) proposes that to the extent that the individual has cognitively matured he will be free. Kelly couches this idea of relative freedom in terms of superordination-subordination. Kelly sees our cognitive and physical universe as a series of superordinate-subordinate object-relationships. That which is superordinate is free from and determines that which is subordinate. The higher any object is situated on the scale the freer it is from other objects and the more power it has to determine the course of action of other objects.

Similarly, a concept (construct) is superordinate–to the extent that it is applicable in a number of differing situations, i.e. to the extent that it can be used to predict or control a number of events; the construct is subordinate to the extent that it is controlled by or is ignorant of the dynamics of these events. Thus, to the extent that we are able to construe our circumstances, to the extent that we can create superordinate constructs about the environment, then we can find freedom for ourself from the domination of these circumstances and environmental objects. However, we can also enslave ourself to our own ideas, or set them up as superordinate to ourself. In such a case, we can find freedom only by “reconstruing” our life.

A comparable point is made by Jerome Bruner (1957, pp.41-69) when he speaks of going beyond the information given.” To the extent that the individual is able to divorce himself from the specific data of experience and categorize or code and develop heuristic models in regards to, this data — to the extent that he can do this—he will have in his possession strong, adaptive powers of cognition which place him in a position of freedom and of control.