There are two types of statements which one can make: “synthetic” and “analytic”. A synthetic statement is one which is true or false, tells one about the world is corrigible, and depends upon future experience for verification. An analytic statement, on the other hand, is one which is neither true not false, tells one nothing about the world, but instead tells one about words, is incorrigible, and is independent of future experience. The former is an empirical, scientific assertion, the latter is a definition.

Analytic arguments

The logical empiricist believes that such statements as: “All human behavior is determined by previous happenings” or “Much human behavior is free and an expression of the individual’s volition” are analytic for the declarers do not accept evidence which would contradict their statements. The advocate of free will declares that the first statement is invalid because he can commit an act, such as raising his arm, which is of his own volition.

The determinist doesn’t accept this evidence, because he states that even the act of raising one’s arm is determined by numerable past events which, when considered at the particular moment of the arm raising, compel the individual to raise his arm rather than perform some other action. The determinist states that all decisions and actions are made and performed on the basis of past events whether these events be known or not. Therefore, any decision or action which appears to be free is actually determined by some as yet unknown agent. Therefore, the first statement is analytic. Similarly, the second statement is analytic: the determinist can offer evidence to show how a particular act was a resultant of a number of previous events.

However, the free-willist rejects this evidence, because decision-making is one sufficient condition for an action. We need not proceed further. The individual at the particular moment of decision or action actually chooses between several alternatives. Furthermore, the determinist can’t enumerate every previous event which influenced the decision, therefore leaving room for free choice. We can see that this disagreement is as meaningless as the previous one. Both sides will accept no evidence to contradict their stands. Neither side seems to meet the standards imposed by logical empiricists regarding a verifiable, empirical statement.

This is particularly devastating for the determinists who consider themselves to be the bastions of empirical thought. As one of the participants in Williams (1980, p. 11) hypothetical dialogue notes:

I don’t see how you [determinist] can say both that “Everything that happens has a cause” is an empirical statement and that there aren’t any possible observations that would show that a happening doesn’t have a cause. If there aren’t any possible observations that would show that a happening doesn’t have a cause, then determinism would not be refutable in principle, in which case it would not be empirical.

Furthermore, the logical empiricist in analyzing the terms “determinism” and “free-will” as they are variously defined, concludes that there is actually very little difference between them. The main point of disagreement seems to hinge about the concept of internal and external determinants. The free-willist states that an individual’s actions determined. The determining factors are all internal, i.e. they all arise from the individual’s “will!’. The determinist states that all of one’s decisions are determined ultimately by factors; they may at times appear to be determined by immediate internal factors, but inevitably these factors can be traced back to external origins and influences. However, is the determinist’s position really the converse of the willist’s position? From where do the internal factors within the will arise? What gives birth to them? Does this lead to an infinite progression back to determining factors.