Are not the internal factors the products of past events? Even if we engage in an infinite progression (or regression) we are required to recognize that past events determined these internal factors. Conversely, don’t the determining factors have to always be internal at the moment of decision? Therefore, aren’t external factors always secondary? Confronted with this seemingly unresolvable dilemma we can do one of two things, either live with the dilemma or consider the terms “internal” and “external” to be arbitrary and thereby eliminate the distinction between the determinism and free-will arguments.

After all, where does the internal environment leave off and the external begin? The point of differentiation seems to be arbitrary: we look up the street and see “internal” causes and hence free-will, we look down the street and see “external” causes and, hence, determinism. Consequently, we may conclude that the determinist and free-will advocate are actually standing on common ground and only need to realize such to be able to work together effectively.

Practical expedience

Some determinists and freewill advocates go so far as to agree with the logical empiricist up to this point; however, they believe they must uphold their position as practically expedient or, frequently, necessary. The empiricist, however, states that since both positions are scientifically meaningless, they are of little pragmatic value. Instead, the psychologist should reconstruct his theory of determinism to read: where we have an event and want to predict this event and gain knowledge about the event, then we must find a functional relationship between this event and a preceding event. The psychologist should reconstruct their theory of freedom to read: within our daily existence, we assume that our actions are the products of our own decisions, which in turn are consciously and rationally willed by each of us.

Each of us must assume this freedom if we are to feel the weight of responsibility and the joy of influence, creativity and productivity. We must assume freedom if we are to retain a self-identity, just as, in another respect, we must assume determinism if we are to reside in a nonchaotic world and have some conception of a predictable future. Both the term “freedom” and the term “determinism” thus become part of a more general resolution: we shall consider ourselves and our fellow men as independent, unique entities which make use of past events and agents to decide upon future actions which may influence or determine the course of other beings, thoughts, etc. Thus, the terms “determinism” and “free-will” become unnecessary–yet the use of the concepts which underlie these terms, as uncovered by the logical empiricist, become extremely useful — even more useful then when they were covered over by speculative, naive terminology.