Thus, the arguments for free-will all are of a rather philosophical or theological bent. They may be set into the following categories: (a) the introspective-philosophical arguments, (b) the psychic and physical indeterminacy argument, and (c) empirical verification argument. Each of these arguments shall now be briefly sketched and criticized.

Introspective-Philosophical arguments

The free-will advocate in William (1980, p. 22) suggests that:

. . . the introspective evidence for free will is one of the strongest reasons for rejecting determinism. Our conviction that we can choose and act differently in different circumstances is based on immediate and self-evident intuitions of our ability to choose and act differently. Denying these immediate intuitions would seem to be a flagrant denial of the facts.

A similar sentiment was offered many years ago by Bordon P. Bowne (1887, pp. 219-234) his Introduction to Psychological Theory. He makes the basic statement that no psychologist would venture to deny the existence of “willing” as a form of internal experience; furthermore, action does not always follow immediately from some external impingement; rather, there is hesitancy, deliberation, and comparison of consequences involved before many acts are conducted. Similarly, in direct contradiction to Freud, Leslie John Adkins (1959, pp. 40=42), states that: “in crisis the individual becomes acutely aware of that part of himself which is most peculiarly ‘I’. He experiences that ‘I’ as a self which is independent of whatever determined elements may also be at work within his Personality structure. And this independent factor often decides which determined element shall overbear the rest.”

If human behavior was totally determined, not only would we be unable to make these critical decisions, but we would also be unable to engage in empirical enterprise, for, in the words of Bordon Bowne: “the attainment of truth implies the existence of a standard of truth in the mind, and the possibility of directing our rational activity accordingly.” (Bowne, 1887, p. 227) The scientist must be able to criticize his processes, repeat his arguments, and. discard misleading associations, Bowne does not believe that the determined human being can do these things.

In criticism of this argument, we may refer to Freud’s counter evidence, and note that determinists do not necessarily limit their studies to external impingements and actions: internal, sequentially determined processes are studied by many determinists (e.g. Freudians and Neo behaviorists — such as N. E. Miller and Howard Kendler). Therefore, a pause between external impingement and action in no way contradicts deterministic assumptions. Finally, we might note that a scientist must in fact not be free, for he must be determined by his data — ideally speaking, of course; if the scientist is allowed to be free of his data, then the empirical enterprise will cease to be of any use.

The psychic and physical indeterminacy argument

Whatever the degree of theoretical determinism that the psychologist is prepared to admit regarding human behavior, it is certain that the accuracies of psychological prediction are limited; furthermore, even within the “neat” science, of physics, indeterminacy is becoming an increasingly troublesome problem.

William McDougall asserted that in all behavior there is some degree of indeterminacy which can never be completely eliminated. (Boring, 1929, p. p. 460) Humankind is always to some extent free from the confines of empirical understanding or control, if for no other reason than the fact that all of the variables related to his behavior can never be totally understood or controlled. Predictions are always limited, Cattell (1950, pp. 662-663) notes, as a result of “the extent to which the number of factors at work transcends our memory capacity, and the extent to which the speed of our communication falls short of the speed of action of factors upon the psychological event in question.”